



PERGAMON

Personality and Individual Differences 25 (1998) 575-589

PERSONALITY AND
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

The value orientations underlying liberalism-conservatism

Valerie Braithwaite

Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra, A.C.T. 0200, Australia

Received 26 September 1997

Abstract

Four value instruments, the Morris (1956) Ways to Live [Morris, C. W. (1956). *Varieties of human value*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press], the Rokeach (1968) Value Survey [Rokeach, M. (1968). *Beliefs, attitudes and values*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass], the Braithwaite and Law (1985) Goal, Mode and Social Values Inventories [Braithwaite, V. A. & Law, H. G. (1985). Structure of human values: Testing the adequacy of the Rokeach Value Survey. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 49, 250-263] and the Scott (1960, 1965) Foreign Policy Goals and Personal Values [Scott, W. A. (1960). International ideology and interpersonal ideology. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 24, 419-435; Scott, W. A. (1965). *Values and organizations: A study of fraternities and sororities*. Chicago: Rand McNally], were used to predict conservatism and to examine the structure of values underlying conservatism. The study confirmed the hypothesis that social and personal values would cohere around a security oriented dimension (*security through order and status*) and a harmony oriented dimension (*humanistic and expressive concerns*). Two additional value dimensions were identified, *personal accomplishment and religiosity and personal restraint*. *Security through order and status, humanistic and expressive concerns and religiosity and personal restraint* made significant contributions net of each other to explaining liberalism-conservatism. These findings are consistent with the proposition that at the value level of analysis, liberal and conservative objectives are not necessarily perceived as incompatible: Their incompatibility arises at the attitudinal level when the constraints of situation, particularly social institutions, come into play. © 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

The security-harmony social values model proposes two dimensions to explain the way in which individuals evaluate political and social events (Braithwaite, 1994, 1997, 1998; Braithwaite et al., 1996; Blamey and Braithwaite, 1997). The security dimension is defined by social values concerned with the accumulation and protection of resources within one's group. National economic development, the rule of law, national greatness and national security typify this orientation. The harmony dimension captures the more cooperative facets of human life: an interest in human connectedness, concerns for equality and mutual respect, and peaceful co-existence. Social values

that define the harmony orientation include rule by the people, equality, a good life for others, human dignity and international cooperation.

The security and harmony value orientations are relatively independent in student populations and are positively and significantly correlated in general population samples (Braithwaite, 1994; Blamey and Braithwaite, 1997). Those who value security goals for their society also tend to value harmony goals. In studies of political attitudes, left-right identification and voting practices, both the security and harmony value scales have had a significant role to play in predicting political preferences (Braithwaite, 1982, 1994, 1997; Heaven, 1990a,b, 1991; Blamey and Braithwaite, 1997). Adherence to security values inclines individuals toward the political right, while support for harmony values moves them toward the political left. Most importantly, when these value orientations are included together in the same regression equation, they contribute independently to the criterion variable, with little overlap in the variation they explain (Braithwaite, 1994, 1997, 1998).

For this reason, the positive relationship between security and harmony values merits comment. Many attitude researchers would have predicted that any significant correlation between security and harmony values should be negative, not positive (Feather, 1979; Schwartz, 1994). Response bias in the measuring instrument, the Goal, Mode and Social Values Inventories (Braithwaite, 1979; Braithwaite and Law, 1985), has been proposed as an explanation for these findings (Schwartz, 1994). The Goal, Mode and Social Values Inventories extends the Rokeach Value Survey to 79 items each rated on a seven point scale.

Braithwaite (1994) has explained the zero to positive correlations between the security and harmony scales in terms of the defining features of societal values. Kluckhohn (1951) defined values as shared principles about what is desirable in a community, that guide and coordinate the actions of individual members. Rokeach (1973) drew on this work to arrive at his own definition of values as goals and modes of conduct that transcend specific objects and situations and that are considered preferable to their converse goal and mode of conduct. In contrast, attitudes were defined as beliefs that focused on specific objects and situations, without the quality of absolute and universal desirability (Scott, 1965). Schwartz (1994) has demonstrated the universal property of Rokeach's values with data showing their relevance and importance across 42 cultural contexts.

The work of both Rokeach (1979) and Schwartz (1994) supports the claim that harmony and security values transcend institutions in terms of their public acceptability. Most people might be expected to see merit in both kinds of value orientations. Thus, a positive correlation might be expected in a well-socialized individual who has learnt that both security and harmony values have a role to play in society. This assertion does not preclude various institutions from prioritizing one set of values over another, which they clearly do. Political institutions in democratic societies require citizens to trade off their security and harmony values if they are to engage with the political process. The adversarial nature of politics discourages individuals from expressing harmony and security values simultaneously, although data suggest that this is what most would like to do (Blamey and Braithwaite, 1997; Inglehart, 1977). When the political right and left compete for the right to govern, citizens trade off their security and harmony values to arrive at a position on the ubiquitous right-left continuum.

Two dimensional value models of political and social goals have a long history (Fromm, 1949; Lipset, 1963; Rokeach, 1973; Inglehart, 1977; Rasinski, 1987; Katz and Hass, 1988). The security-harmony model, like some of these models, is not restricted to social values. Counterparts in the personal value domain have been identified. Support for wealth, status and power at a national

level is most likely to be accompanied by interest in goals and modes that promote access to prized societal resources at an individual level, most notably economic prosperity, social recognition and being ambitious. Similarly, interest in the pursuit of harmony values at the societal level extends into the personal value domain with strong commitment to inner harmony, personal development, consideration for others, tolerance, and wisdom. Security and harmony values at the personal level contribute in their own right to the variation observed in political decision making (Braithwaite, 1997).

To date, the security-harmony value model has been tested using one instrument, the Goal, Mode and Social Values Inventories (Braithwaite, 1979; Braithwaite and Law, 1985). The security and harmony value scales have been used to predict contemporary attitudes and beliefs that have focused on the political issues of the day: the environment, welfare, unemployment, affirmative action, uranium mining and crime control. Liberalism-conservatism has been inferred from measures that are composites of items that tap public opinion on these issues. The methodology that has been used to test the security and harmony model is open to criticism on two fronts. First, do the security and harmony value orientations adequately represent all the values that come into play in explaining attitudes of liberalism-conservatism? Second, do the value orientations of harmony and security play an equally important and substantively similar role in predicting attitudes when the criterion variable is a traditional well-validated psychological measure of conservatism?

1.1. Goals of the present study

This paper uses archival data from 1977 to test the generalizability of the security-harmony model (a) when other established value instruments are involved and (b) when liberalism-conservatism is measured as a psychological personality disposition (Wilson, 1973a), rather than an aggregate of responses to contemporary political issues.

The 1977 study involved the measurement of moral and religious beliefs over a 4 week period at the University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia.¹ In addition to the Goal, Mode and Social Values Inventories (Braithwaite and Law, 1985), the study incorporated three instruments that operationalized values in a way that was conceptually compatible with the definition proposed by Rokeach (1973) and that had established reliability and validity: the Morris (1956) Ways to Live, the Rokeach (1968) Value Survey and the Scott (1960, 1965) Foreign Policy Goals and Personal Values. The inclusion of these measures along with the Goal, Mode and Social Values Inventories provided the opportunity to test whether the security and harmony dimensions were distinctive to one instrument or whether they accounted for patterns of relationships when the pool of value measures was expanded to take other instruments into account.

The measure of conservatism available in the 1977 data set was the Wilson and Patterson (1968) C-Scale. The scale comprises 50 items such as death penalty, apartheid, student pranks, hippies, socialism, teenage drivers and women judges to which respondents indicate their support or

¹The study was conducted by the author and the late Dr. Henry Law, Psychology Department, University of Queensland. Data from the values questionnaires together with several composite measures were archived and have been used to test the hypothesis of this paper.

opposition. These items comply with the definition of attitudes as evaluations of specific issues and objects proposed by Rokeach (1973). In no instance within this instrument are respondents required to indicate the transcending principles or values that guide their evaluations. The items of the C-Scale have been factor analyzed in several studies with data from Britain, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Australia. Findings support the interpretation of a general bipolar factor of radicalism-conservatism as well as a number of more specific content factors (Bagley, 1970; Wilson, 1970; Robertson and Cochrane, 1973; Feather, 1975; Kline and Cooper, 1984). The C-scale has been shown to correlate highly with authoritarianism (Kline and Cooper, 1984).

Although the C-Scale has dated (hippies and pyjama parties no longer represent novel expressions of social freedom), its validity at the time of data collection was well established. The instrument was one of the few measures of conservatism that had been psychometrically investigated and validated for use among Australian university students (Feather, 1975, 1979). Furthermore, Feather (1979) chose this scale as the dependent variable in his study of the relationship between values, as measured by the Rokeach Value Survey and conservatism. Because Rokeach designed the Value Survey to broadly represent the value domain without overlap, there was little opportunity with these data to examine the presumed inverse relationship between values representing discipline and order and those that are libertarian and expressive (Feather, 1984). The present study provides the opportunity to revisit this work, using the same dependent variable, a similar population, but a much more extensive pool of value measures to provide a more detailed account of the values underlying conservatism.

1.2. Methodological controls

The methodological strength of using a number of value measures in this study lies in their conceptual similarities and operational differences. In spite of the same theoretical starting point of values as "conceptions of the desirable" (Kluckhohn, 1951), the scales differed dramatically in the way in which they cover the domain. Yet, because values are socially and personally desirable principles, all instruments, except the Scott (1965) Personal Values Scales, are positively worded. Research findings in the domain of authoritarianism suggest that the security value orientation is likely to be affected by acquiescence response bias (Couch and Keniston, 1960; Peabody, 1966). There is some evidence to suggest that the harmony value orientation, in particular, may be affected by social desirability bias. Creating a favourable impression is more important to those who prioritize social values such as a world at peace and freedom over personal values (Kelly et al., 1972).

The original data set provided statistical controls for both response biases. For respondents who might interpret certain values as being more acceptable than others and be motivated to present themselves in a particularly positive light, a measure of impression management was included, the Crowne and Marlowe (1964) Social Desirability Scale (Paulhus, 1991). The scale used to control statistically for a yea-saying tendency was the Couch and Keniston (1960) Agreement Response Scale. Both response bias scales were used by Kerlinger (1984) in his work on liberalism and conservatism.

This paper, therefore, sets out to test three hypotheses:

H1: The values that are positively and negatively related to conservatism are relatively independent of each other: They do not represent opposite poles of a single continuum.

H2: The values that are positively and negatively related to conservatism cohere around two relatively independent dimensions that represent security and harmony.

H3: The value dimensions underlying conservatism and their interrelationships are not a function of response bias, although small bivariate relationships are expected between security and acquiescence and harmony and social desirability.

2. Method

2.1. Participants and procedure

The data base comprised responses of 480 introductory psychology students at the University of Queensland in 1977 to a battery of tests measuring religious and moral beliefs. The data were collected in three testing sessions, spaced approximately a week apart, with each session generally lasting less than an hour. Participation was voluntary and anonymity was maintained through issuing numerical identification cards to respondents in the first testing session. The questionnaires were presented to respondents in six different random orders with a biographical information questionnaire being completed at the end of the study. Upon eliminating respondents who did not complete all questionnaires, the sample was reduced to 465.

2.2. Independent variables

Rokeach's *Value Survey* requires respondents to rank order 18 terminal values followed by 18 instrumental values in terms of their importance as guiding principles in life. In this study, seven point rating scales for each item were substituted for the ranking task with 1 meaning "I reject this" through to 7 meaning "I accept this as being of the greatest importance". The rating form of the Value Survey has been examined previously (Feather, 1973; Rankin and Grube, 1980; Ng, 1982), resulting in Rankin and Grube (1980) concluding that the ranked and rated versions were of comparable reliability and validity.

Scott's *Scales of Foreign Policy Goals*, designed specifically for use within the United States, comprise eight scales (pacifism, cultural development, humanitarianism, coexistence, religiousness, independence, power, nationalism), each with 4 to 6 items rated on a three point scale (1 = "it should not be a goal", 2 = "depends", and 3 = "it should be a goal"). Minor modifications were made to the wording of some of the items in Scott's scales to make them meaningful within an Australian context. One scale, independence, was omitted because of an unacceptable alpha reliability coefficient.

Scott's *Personal Value Scales* represent 12 moral ideals (creativity, independence, intellectualism, academic achievement, social skills, loyalty, status, physical development, honesty, self-control, kindness, religiousness). Each scale contains 20 statements of belief or attitude rated on a three-point scale: 1 = "always dislike", 2 = "depends on the situation" and 3 = "always admire".

Morris' 13 *Ways to Live* are complex paragraphs representing different philosophical positions on what constitutes the good life: way 1, preserve the best; way 2, cultivate independence; way 3, show sympathetic concern for others; way 4, experience pleasure, abandonment; way 5, enjoy life through group participation; way 6, master threats through technology; way 7, accept and enjoy

diversity; way 8, enjoy simple, easily attainable pleasures; way 9, wait in quiet receptivity; way 10, control the self; way 11, meditate on the inner life; way 12, take part in daring and adventurous deeds and way 13, let oneself be used. Each paragraph is rated on a scale from 1 (I dislike it very much) to 7 (I like it very much).

The Goal, Mode and Social Values Inventories comprise 14 multi-item scales. Two scales represent social values: national strength and order and international harmony and equality. Six represent personal goals in life: traditional religiosity, personal growth and inner harmony, physical well-being, secure and satisfying interpersonal relations, social standing and social stimulation. Six represent personal modes of conduct: a positive orientation to others, competence and effectiveness, propriety in dress and manners, religious commitment, assertiveness and getting ahead. Individual items are rated from 1 meaning "I reject this" to 7 meaning "I accept this as of the greatest importance".

2.3. Control variables

Four variables were used as controls: age (measured in eight categories, the median age being 20 years), sex [1=female (70%), 2=male (30%)], the Social Desirability Scale ($M=13.47$, $S.D.=5.28$) and the Agreement Response Scale ($M=57.14$, $S.D.=11.07$). Age and sex were included because Feather (1979) reported that both affected conservatism scores in a similar population.

2.4. Dependent variable

Wilson and Patterson's Conservatism Scale is a 50 item instrument comprising one or two word items, half of which are liberal, half conservative. Respondents indicated if they were in favour of (yes), opposed to (no) or undecided about (?) each item. Items were scored such that a liberal response was represented by 0, a neutral response by 1, and a conservative response by 2. Scores on the Conservatism Scale had a mean of 35.97 and a standard deviation of 7.83.²

3. Results

3.1. Data analysis overview

Analyses to investigate the major value dimensions underlying the liberalism–conservatism attitude continuum took place in four stages. The first task was to reduce 70 value measures to a more manageable subset of variables that were relevant to attitudes of liberalism–conservatism.

²Data for the C-Scale, the Couch and Keniston Agreement Response Scale and the Crowne and Marlow Social Desirability Scale were archived as aggregate scores rather than individual items. No records remain for estimation of alpha reliability coefficients in this context. Notwithstanding this situation, the scales are assumed to be psychometrically sound measures in the present context. First, a body of research supports their use at this time in this context (Feather, 1975, 1979; Kerlinger, 1984). Second, the study was successful in replicating past findings using these measures, thereby suggesting that nothing untoward had happened in the collection of these data.

This objective was achieved through selecting all scales/items that had significant Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients with the C-Scale using a 0.05 (two tailed) alpha error rate. In this way, value measures were screened out of further consideration if they were not related to conservatism at the bivariate level.

The variables that were significantly related to conservatism at stage 1 were reduced further using a principal components analysis followed by an oblimin rotation at stage 2. From this analysis, the dimensionality of liberal and conservative values could be ascertained.³

Factor scores for these dimensions were subsequently entered into an OLS regression analysis, together with the control variables of age, sex, acquiescence and social desirability, to examine the relative importance of the value factors in predicting the attitude of liberalism-conservatism.

In the fourth stage, factor scores were correlated with the measures of social desirability and acquiescence to determine how much of their variation was due to response bias.

3.2. Stage 1

Of the original 69 value scales or items, 46 correlated significantly with scores on the C-Scale: 16 from the Value Survey with coefficients ranging from -0.20 to $+0.22$; five ways to live with coefficients from -0.18 to 0.21 ; six scales from the Foreign Policy Goals with coefficients from -0.25 to $+0.23$; 10 Personal Value Scales with coefficients from -0.20 to $+0.24$ and 9 Goal, Mode and Social Values scales with coefficients from -0.21 to $+0.30$. The 46 measures, their means, standard deviations and, where applicable, alpha reliability coefficients appear in Table 1.

In addition to correlating value scales and items with the C-Scale, regression models were tested to ascertain how much variation in the C-Scale could be accounted for by each instrument. Three of the four instruments contributed to 20% or more of the variance in C-Scale scores. The Scott (1960, 1965) Foreign Policy Goals and Personal Values had an adjusted R^2 of 25% [$F(15, 444) = 11.29, p < 0.001$], the Goal, Mode and Social Values Inventories explained 22% of the variation [$F(16, 442) = 9.29, p < 0.001$] and the Value Survey accounted for 20% [$F(34, 424) = 4.38, p < 0.001$]. The 13 complex paragraphs describing lifestyles in the Morris (1956) Ways to Live made the weakest contribution of all four instruments with an adjusted R^2 of 11% [$F(17, 444) = 4.29, p < 0.001$].

3.3. Stage 2

The interrelationships among these value correlates of liberalism-conservatism were next examined to ascertain whether they could be reduced to a set of basic value dimensions, in particular, the value orientations of security and harmony.

To examine the relationships among the values, both principal components analysis and principal axes factor analysis were used with varimax and oblimin rotations. Two criteria defined the optimal

³Security and harmony were two major dimensions that were hypothesized to underlie this data set. This hypothesis does not preclude the emergence of a number of specific dimensions, a likely outcome given the diverse nature of the measures included in this analysis. For this reason, exploratory factoring methods were preferred to confirmatory methods.

Table 1

Factor loadings >0.30 after an oblimin rotation of four principal components extracted from the predictors of conservatism (*M*, *S.D.*, α)

Values (<i>M</i> , <i>S.D.</i> , α)	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
Rokeach				
Clean (4.98, 1.12)	0.55			
Obedient (4.36, 1.28)	0.43	0.46		
Polite (5.12, 1.03)	0.42	0.41	0.38	
Responsible (5.69, 0.96)	0.42		0.42	
Ambitious (4.88, 1.19)	0.63			
Capable (5.40, 0.92)	0.48		0.32	
Broadminded (5.59, 0.96)			0.58	
Imaginative (4.92, 1.11)			0.46	
National security (4.73, 1.39)	0.57			
Family security (5.80, 1.14)			0.47	
A world at peace (5.71, 1.25)			0.63	
A world of beauty (5.38, 1.14)			0.69	
A comfortable life (4.30, 1.23)	0.56			
An exciting life (5.21, 1.08)		-0.36		
Freedom (5.90, 1.08)			0.60	
Equality (5.56, 1.23)			0.75	
Morris				
Preserve the best we have attained (4.58, 1.52)		0.33		
Experience pleasure, abandonment (3.94, 1.60)		-0.54		
Control self and hold to high ideals (3.32, 1.48)				
Control threats with technology (4.07, 1.38)	0.46			
Be flexible and appreciate diversity (5.42, 1.28)		-0.33		
Scott				
Pacifism (10.50, 1.61, 0.50)	-0.33		0.42	
Cultural development (10.37, 1.41, 0.44)			0.37	0.32
Coexistence (9.78, 1.47, 0.45)			0.32	
Humanitarianism (14.67, 2.10, 0.66)	-0.41		0.43	
International power (8.27, 1.72, 0.57)	0.58			
Religiousness (society) (11.12, 3.92, 0.91)		0.76		
Academic achievement (49.22, 5.03, 0.81)				0.61
Social skills (51.18, 5.14, 0.83)				0.70
Loyalty (50.22, 5.38, 0.84)				0.70
Status (45.98, 4.69, 0.78)	0.39			0.69
Independence (45.35, 5.04, 0.78)		-0.54		0.34
Creativity (49.39, 4.98, 0.82)		-0.42		0.62
Honesty (46.24, 4.88, 0.80)		0.51		0.37
Physical development (48.47, 5.27, 0.87)				0.68
Religiousness (individual) (42.42, 7.73, 0.92)		0.78		
Self-control (44.06, 5.15, 0.80)		0.47		0.32

Continued opposite

Table 1—continued

Values (<i>M</i> , <i>S.D.</i> , α)	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
Braithwaite and Law				
International harmony and equality (57.04, 7.59, 0.86)			0.82	
National strength and order (19.06, 4.48, 0.82)	0.68			
Propriety in dress and manners (34.34, 5.87, 0.83)	0.58	0.36		
Personal growth and inner harmony (34.50, 3.97, 0.76)			0.58	
Physical well-being (14.86, 2.81, 0.79)	0.46			
Secure and satisfying relations (27.62, 3.81, 0.70)	0.40		0.42	
Traditional religiosity (14.64, 5.30, 0.75)		0.80		
Social standing (11.06, 3.18, 0.70)	0.70			
Getting ahead (7.87, 2.36, 0.67)	0.70			

solution. The first goal was to maximize simple structure, while the second was to ensure that the factor solution was stable across factoring methods and rotations (Gorsuch, 1974).

The solution presented above is that of a principal components analysis with an oblimin rotation. Following the scree test, four components were extracted, accounting for 19, 10, 9 and 6% of the variance, respectively, representing a total of 44% of the variance in the item set. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 1.

The first factor was defined by both societal and personal values. The societal values with high factor loadings were national security (Rokeach), international power (Scott), national strength and order (Braithwaite and Law) and mastering societal threats through technology (Morris). At the personal level, the variables with strong positive loadings were propriety in dress and manners, social standing, getting ahead and physical well-being (Braithwaite and Law) and clean, obedient, ambitious, capable and a comfortable life (Rokeach). The social values reflect concern for control, domination and order. The personal values reflect desires for success in economic and social terms and acceptance of conventional standards of behaviour. Factor 1 captures values that ensure protection and safety through adherence to rules and the acquisition of status of both a material and social kind. The factor is labelled *security through order and status*.

The second factor is defined primarily by the three measures of religiosity, two from Scott representing personal and societal religiosity, the third from Braithwaite and Law. Other positive, significant loadings on factor 2 were honesty and self-control (Scott), with negative loadings emerging for independence and creativity (Scott) and experiencing pleasure and abandonment (Morris). The factor is labelled *religiosity and personal restraint*.

The third factor also brought together values that pertained to the state of society and to the state of the individual. The dominant societal measures were international harmony and equality (Braithwaite and Law), equality, freedom, a world at peace and a world of beauty (Rokeach) and pacifism and humanitarianism (Scott). The personal values that made a major contribution to defining factor 3 were imaginative, broadminded and family security (Rokeach) and personal growth and inner harmony (Braithwaite and Law). Factor 3 is defined as *humanistic and expressive concerns*.

The fourth factor was labelled *personal accomplishment* since it brought together Scott's scales

Table 2

Pearson product moment correlations, unstandardized regression coefficients (standard error) and standardized regression coefficients for the control variables and the values factor scores in an OLS model predicting conservatism¹

Predictors	<i>r</i>	Unstandardized regression coefficients (S.E.)	Standardized regression coefficients
Age	0.06	0.14 (0.13)	0.04
Sex	0.03	-0.10 (0.70)	-0.01
Acquiescence	0.05	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.03
Social desirability	0.02	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.06
Security through order and status	0.37*	2.96 (0.34)	0.39*
Religiosity and personal restraint	0.24*	2.17 (0.33)	0.28*
Humanistic and expressive concerns	-0.28*	-1.77 (0.32)	-0.23*
Personal accomplishment	0.04	0.45 (0.32)	0.06

*Significant at the 0.01 level.

concerned with achievement in three different spheres of life. The physical sphere was represented by physical development, the cognitive by academic achievement and creativity and the social by social skills, loyalty and status.

The correlations between these factors were low. The strongest relationship was 0.18 between *humanistic and expressive concerns* and *personal accomplishment*. *Security through order and status* correlated 0.12 with *humanistic and expressive concerns*.

3.4. Stage 3

In order to gain some insight into the relative importance of these four dimensions in predicting liberalism-conservatism, the factor scores were used as predictors in an OLS regression analysis. Also included were the control variables of age, sex, acquiescence and social desirability. The standardized and unstandardized regression coefficients for the full regression model are given in Table 2. The adjusted R^2 for the model was 26% [$F(8, 448) = 21.54, p < 0.001$].

None of the control variables made a significant contribution to the prediction of liberalism-conservatism either at the bivariate or multivariate level of analysis. With regard to values, three of the four factors were significant. Those with higher scores on conservatism placed greater importance on *security through order and status* and *religiosity and personal restraint* and less importance on *humanistic and expressive concerns*. The remaining value factor, *personal accomplishment*, was not significantly related to conservatism. This finding can be explained by the way in which conservative and liberal elements come together on this factor. Part of *personal accomplishment* is defined by conventionality and elitism and part is defined by an interest in cultural activities and personal growth. Factor 4 thus has an elitism pull toward conservatism countering a personal growth pull toward liberalism.

3.5. Stage 4

The factor scores for *security through order and status*, *religiosity and personal restraint*, *humanistic and expressive concerns* and *personal accomplishment* were correlated with the social desirability and acquiescence scores. Acquiescence was significantly related to *security through order and status* as expected ($r=0.34$, $p<0.01$), but not to *humanistic and expressive concerns* ($r=-0.01$, ns). Neither value orientation was related to social desirability ($r=0.07$, ns; $r=0.09$, ns, respectively). Of the newly emerging value orientations, *religiosity and personal restraint* had significant correlations with both response bias measures: Restraint was valued more highly by those who responded in a socially desirable manner ($r=0.21$, $p<0.01$), while the opposite pole of this dimension, seeking pleasure, was valued more highly by those inclined to acquiesce ($r=-0.24$, $p<0.01$). Also correlating positively with acquiescence was *personal accomplishment* ($r=0.15$, $p<0.01$).

When partial correlations between factor scores were calculated controlling for both acquiescence and social desirability, no significant changes occurred. The value dimensions remained relatively independent.

4. Discussion

When Feather (1979) used the Rokeach Value Survey to predict scores on the C-Scale, he found that those with high conservatism scores placed relatively higher importance on the values of salvation, security, cleanliness and obedience and relatively lower importance on the values of equality, freedom, love, being broadminded, imaginative and independent. Feather concluded that more values were involved in explaining conservatism than had been suggested by Rokeach (1973) with his two value equality-freedom model of political ideology.

This paper partially reconciles the seemingly contradictory positions to emerge from the work of Rokeach (1973) and Feather (1979). Many specific values are linked with conservatism, but these values cohere around a limited set of dimensions of human valuing.

At the specific level of value items and scales, the results of the present study are highly consistent with those of Feather (1979), demonstrating the generalizability of his findings beyond the Rokeach Value Survey. The inclusion of the Morris (1956) Ways to Live, the Braithwaite and Law (1985) Goal, Mode and Social Values Inventories and the Scott (1960, 1965) Foreign Policy Goals and Personal Values provide a body of data to support the conclusion that the value base to conservatism is substantial.

What this paper adds to the work of Feather (1979) is an analysis of the relationships among the values that are associated with conservatism. The data base constitutes forty-six value measures taken from four instruments. The theoretical coherence among these measures is that they all subscribe to the definition of values as conceptions of the desirable that transcend specific objects and situations. The combination of different operationalizations of the values construct offers a safety net against attaching undue significance to instrument specific factors.

The results of the factor analysis demonstrate that values do not exist in isolation and that there are a smaller set of basic value orientations that are represented across instruments. Four relatively independent dimensions emerged from the analysis, three of which made significant contributions

to the prediction of conservatism net of the others: *Security through order and status*, *humanistic and expressive concerns* and *religiosity and personal restraint*.

Security through order and status and *humanistic and expressive concerns* represented the security and harmony value orientations found to be predictive of political conservatism in earlier work (Braithwaite, 1982, 1994; Heaven, 1990a,b, 1991). The scales from the Braithwaite and Law (1985) Goal, Mode and Social Values Inventories that have defined the security and harmony orientations in other work (Braithwaite, 1994, 1997) have strong significant loadings (above 0.5) only on these factors.

Religiosity and personal restraint, while not hypothesized as a predictor of conservatism at the outset, nevertheless has support from other quarters. In a review of the value domain, Braithwaite and Scott (1991) identified seven commonly occurring value orientations, two of which were religiosity and unrestrained pleasure. Furthermore, *religiosity and personal restraint*, when considered along with the security and harmony orientations, completes the Wilson (1973a) depiction of the ideal conservative: someone who has a fundamental religious orientation, who insists on strict rules, who prefers the conventional and traditional, who is militaristic and intolerant of minorities and whose political leanings are pro-establishment.

The importance of the fourth factor, *personal accomplishment*, is more ambiguous. Three arguments can be made for dismissing the factor: Factor scores did not correlate significantly with conservatism at the bivariate level, they did not emerge as a significant predictor in the multivariate analysis and the factor was defined by scales from the one instrument, that of Scott (1965). The case for reconsidering the importance of *personal accomplishment* in future work is theoretical, rather than empirical. The scales defining *personal accomplishment* overlap with one of the recurring themes in the value literature, social adeptness (Braithwaite and Scott, 1991). In addition, *personal accomplishment* could have more complex theoretical connections with liberalism-conservatism than these results suggest. *Personal accomplishment* encompasses two components which have well-established links with conservatism (Wilson, 1973a): Acquiring knowledge is a negative correlate of conservatism, whereas being part of society's elite is a positive correlate. Future work should seek to measure these components more discretely, thereby teasing apart their effects on conservatism.

Wilson (1973b) has argued that the coherence of the diverse attitude clusters in the C-Scale is attributable to a single psychological antecedent, the fear of uncertainty. Given that values are socially acceptable manifestations of human needs, Wilson's thesis fits well with the emergence of the security value orientation, *security through order and status*. The emergence of *religiosity and personal restraint* as an independent predictor of conservatism does not undermine the thesis in any serious way. *Religiosity and personal restraint* can be interpreted as another way in which individuals deal with the common problem of fear of uncertainty. The influence of *humanistic and expressive concerns*, however, suggests that other social and psychological factors may be at work in shaping the conservative personality. Working against fear of uncertainty may be a need for competence and productiveness of the kind postulated by Maslow (1954) and White (1959) and incorporated by Fromm (1949) into his humanistic ethic.

This study shows that the value orientations that predict conservatism are relatively independent of each other in circumstances where attitudes cohere around a single liberal-conservative dimension. The finding is consistent with previous work with the Goal, Mode and Social Values Inventories and measures of political conservatism (Braithwaite, 1994, 1997). Explaining independence at the value level and interdependence at the attitude level poses a challenge for future

research. The interpretation proposed here that differentiates between the world of principles and ideals and the world of institutional constraints and pragmatic choices requires further empirical investigation. This paper makes a contribution to this research agenda through reducing the plausibility of some competing explanations for value orientation independence and attitude interdependence. First, response bias does not appear to account for the independence among the factors. Response bias was present in two factors: *religiosity and personal restraint* was affected by both acquiescence and social desirability, while *security through order and status* showed the expected acquiescence response bias. When response bias was statistically controlled, however, factor intercorrelations did not change substantively and the factors remained relatively independent.

Following a similar methodological line of argument, one might predict that independence would not occur if ranking procedures had been used, rather than rating procedures. This is likely to be the case, not because rating distorts the data, but rather because ranking forces individuals to make choices, choices that are likely to be made in terms of what individuals know of the real world. Once compromise is imposed by the measurement procedures, values are being measured with recognition of context of some kind and not as principles transcending context.

This argument begs the question of what use is it to measure values as ideals and principles that are not tied to specific problems. How one answers this question depends on the direction that one's science takes. Seeking explanations for an individual's behaviour in social and personality factors demands an understanding of how individuals compromise and adapt to their world and, consequently, interest is quickly lost in abstract ideals and principles.

When the objective is changed, however, to how the world might better accommodate individuals, so are the relevant constructs. Seeking institutional arrangements that meet the needs of different groups of individuals in society legitimates an interest in understanding dimensions of human valuing through the ideals and aspirations of individuals in circumstances where all things are possible.

Acknowledgements

My thanks to colleagues in the Research School of Social Sciences for their helpful comments on the ideas presented in this paper, in particular Don Rawson, John Scholz, John Braithwaite, Pat Troy and Bob Goodin. I would also like to acknowledge the support of the late Dr Henry Law who was a collaborator in the collection of the data presented in this paper.

References

- Bagley, C. R. (1970). Racial prejudice and the conservative personality. *Political Studies*, 18, 134-141.
- Blamey, R., & Braithwaite, V. (1997). Testing the security-harmony social values model. *Australian Journal of Psychology*, 49, 71-77.
- Braithwaite, V. A. (1979). *Exploring value structure: an empirical investigation*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Queensland, Brisbane.
- Braithwaite, V. A. (1982). The structure of social values: Validation of Rokeach's two value model. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 21, 203-211.

- Braithwaite, V. (1994). Beyond Rokeach's equality-freedom model: Two dimensional values in a one-dimensional world. *Journal of Social Issues*, 50, 67-94.
- Braithwaite, V. (1997). Harmony and security value orientations in political evaluation. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 23, 401-414.
- Braithwaite, V. (in press). The value balance model of political evaluations. *British Journal of Psychology*.
- Braithwaite, V. A., & Law, H. G. (1985). Structure of human values: Testing the adequacy of the Rokeach Value Survey. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 49, 250-263.
- Braithwaite, V., Makkai, T., & Pittelkow, Y. (1996). Inglehart's materialism-postmaterialism concept: Clarifying the dimensionality debate through Rokeach's model of social values. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 26, 1536-1555.
- Braithwaite, V. A. & Scott, W. A. (1991). Values. In J. P. Robinson, P. R. Shaver & L. S. Wrightsman (Eds.), *Measures of personality and social psychological attitudes*. San Diego: Academic Press.
- Couch, A., & Keniston, K. (1960). Yeasayers and naysayers: Agreeing response set as a personality variable. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 60, 151-174.
- Crowne, D. & Marlowe, D. (1964). *The approval motive*. New York: Wiley.
- Feather, N. T. (1973). The measurement of values: Effects of different assessment procedures. *Australian Journal of Psychology*, 25, 221-231.
- Feather, N. T. (1975). Factor structure of the conservatism scale. *Australian Psychologist*, 10, 179-184.
- Feather, N. T. (1979). Value correlates of conservatism. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 37, 1617-1630.
- Feather, N. T. (1984). Protestant ethic, conservatism and values. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 46, 1132-1141.
- Fromm, E. (1949). *Man for himself: an inquiry into the psychology of ethics*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Gorsuch, R. L. (1974). *Factor analysis*. Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders.
- Heaven, P. C. L. (1990). Human values and suggestions for reducing unemployment. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 29, 257-264.
- Heaven, P. C. L. (1990). Economic beliefs and human values: Further evidence of the two-value model?. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 130, 583-589.
- Heaven, P. C. L. (1991). Voting intention and the two-value model: A further investigation. *Australian Journal of Psychology*, 43, 75-77.
- Inglehart, R. (1977). *The silent revolution*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
- Katz, I., & Hass, R. G. (1988). Racial ambivalence and American value conflict: Correlational and priming studies of dual cognitive structures. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 55, 893-905.
- Kelly, K., Silverman, B. I., & Cochrane, R. (1972). Social desirability and the Rokeach Value Survey. *Journal of Experimental Research in Personality*, 6, 84-87.
- Kerlinger, F. N. (1984). *Liberalism and conservatism: The nature and structure of social attitudes*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Kline, P., & Cooper, C. (1984). A factorial analysis of the authoritarian personality. *British Journal of Psychology*, 75, 171-176.
- Kluckhohn, C. K. M. (1951). Values and value orientations in the theory of action. In T. Parsons & E. Shils (Eds.), *Toward a general theory of action*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Lipset, S. M. (1963). *The first new nation: The United States in historical and comparative perspective*. New York: Basic Books.
- Maslow, A. H. (1954). *Motivation and personality*. New York: Harper.
- Morris, C. W. (1956). *Varieties of human value*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Ng, S. H. (1982). Choosing between the ranking and rating procedures for the comparison of values across cultures. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 12, 169-172.
- Paulhus, D. L. (1991). Measurement and control of response bias. In J. P. Robinson, P. R. Shaver & L. S. Wrightsman (Eds.), *Measures of personality and social psychological attitudes*. San Diego: Academic Press.
- Peabody, D. (1966). Authoritarianism scales and response bias. *Psychological Bulletin*, 65, 11-23.
- Rankin, W. L., & Grube, J. W. (1980). A comparison of ranking and rating procedures for value system measurement. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 10, 233-246.

- Rasinski, K. A. (1987). What's fair is fair, or is it? Value differences underlying public views about social justice. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 53, 201-211.
- Robertson, A., & Cochrane, R. (1973). The Wilson-Patterson Conservatism Scale: A reappraisal. *British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, 12, 428-430.
- Rokeach, M. (1968). *Beliefs, attitudes and values*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Rokeach, M. (1973). *The nature of human values*. New York: Free Press.
- Rokeach, M. (1979). *Understanding human values: individual and societal*. New York: Free Press.
- Schwartz, S. H. (1994). Are there universal aspects in the structure and contents of human values? *Journal of Social Issues*, 50, 19-45.
- Scott, W. A. (1960). International ideology and interpersonal ideology. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 24, 419-435.
- Scott, W. A. (1965). *Values and organizations: A study of fraternities and sororities*. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- White, R. W. (1959). Motivation reconsidered: The concept of competence. *Psychological Review*, 66, 297-333.
- Wilson, G. D. (1970). Is there a general factor in social attitudes? Evidence from a factor-analysis of the Conservatism Scale. *British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, 9, 101-107.
- Wilson, G. D. (1973a). The concept of conservatism. In G. D. Wilson (Ed.), *The psychology of conservatism* (pp. 3-15). New York: Academic Press.
- Wilson, G. D. (1973b). A dynamic theory of conservatism. In G. D. Wilson (Ed.), *The psychology of conservatism* (pp. 257-266). New York: Academic Press.
- Wilson, G. D., & Patterson, J. R. (1968). A new measure of conservatism. *British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, 7, 264-269.